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I. QUESTION FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Whether the Utah State Tax Commission (MTax Commission") 
was correct in holding that a contractor which installs in a 
building certain materials purchased by a charitable, religious or 
governmental entity must pay sales or use taxes based on the cost 
of the materials to the charity, religious or governmental entity. 
The standard of review is set forth by Appellant Arco 
Electric ("Arco") in its briefs. Amicus Curiae Brigham Young 
University ("BYU") believes that the appropriate standard is the 
correction of error standard, inasmuch as the Court is called upon 
to construe and apply several statutes at issue and determine 
legislative intent. Morton Int'l v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
II. GRQUWPS FOR JURISDICTION. 
BYU relies upon the statements of jurisdiction set forth 
by Arco in its two briefs and files this Amicus Curiae brief 
pursuant to Rules 25 and 50(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
III. CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-102 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-42S 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-58S 
Note: Copies of each of these authorities are attached as 
Exhibit 1, in the order shown on this page. D gi ized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
BYU hereby respectfully submits this brief as Amicus 
Curiae in support of Arco and with the consent of the attorneys 
representing both Arco and the Tax Commission. See Exhibit 2 
(Written Consent of All Parties to Filing of Amicus Curiae Brief 
by Brigham Young University and Stipulation as to Filing Date).1 
A. Interest of Amicus Curiae* As a religious and 
charitable institution exempt from imposition of sales and use 
taxes (hereinafter "Sales tax"), BYU is vitally interested in the 
determination of points of law involved in this appeal because it 
has an ongoing construction program on its campus. 
BYU has taken the lead among tax-exempt entities 
similarly situated in contesting the Tax Commission's challenge of 
what have for many years been uncontroverted procedures for 
tax-exempt entities to purchase materials free of Sales tax and 
furnish them to contractors for installation in building projects. 
BYU believes that, in view of the wide ranging impact of 
this case, every possible aid should be made available to this 
Court for assistance in reaching a proper decision and in 
providing more certainty to contractors and tax-exempt entities in 
Utah. 
xThe written consent of the parties allowing an Amicus Curiae 
filing and a Stipulation and Motion for Extension of Time 
originally incorrectly reflected Layton Construction Company as 
the Amicus Curiae. The real party in interest in this case is 
BYU. Thus, Layton Construction has withdrawn and BYU appears as 
an Amicus Curiae in its place. 
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B. Other Aspects of Case. The nature of this case, its 
history and disposition below are more fully set forth in Arco's 
briefs. 
V. ARGUMEHT. 
A. IN DECIDING THIS CASE, THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD 
FIRST BE SOUGHT, WITH ALL DOUBTS RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE 
TAXPAYER. 
This Court has long held that the first step in resolving 
this or any other tax case is to determine the intent of the 
Legislature. Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission. 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408, 411 (1942); Johnson v. 
State Tax Commission. 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831, 32 (Utah 
1966). This is done by reviewing the plain meaning of the 
language, and where the language is plain and unambiguous, as in 
this case, not looking beyond the language of the statutes 
involved. Allisen v. American Leaion Post No. 134. 763 P.2d 806, 
809 (Utah 1988); Savage Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
This Court has adopted additional rules in the event that 
the meaning or wording of a statute are subject to 
interpretation. A long line of cases holds that taxing statutes 
are to be construed strictly and in favor of taxpayers, and that 
doubts should likewise be resolved "liberally" for the benefit of 
taxpayers. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax 
Commission. 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P.2d 650, 651 (1958); Oaden Union 
Railway and Depot Company v. State Tax Commission; 16 Utah 2d 23, 
-3-
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395 P.2d 57, 61 (1964); Merrill 3ean Chevrolet v, State Tax 
Commission, 549 P.2d 443, 446 (Utah 1976); Salt Lake County Vt Tax 
Commission, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
In its Conclusions of Law No. 12 in this case, see 
Exhibit 3, the Tax Commission cited the case of Parson Asphalt 
Products v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980) 
for the proposition that parties seeking exemption from the 
imposition of tax bear the burden of proving their eligibility for 
that exemption. While that may be a true characterization of this 
Court's statement in Parson, the correct focus in this case is not 
whether one of the exempt entities is eligible for a tax 
exemption, but rather which party was the purchaser of materials, 
as construed under Utah Sales tax statutes. That determination 
should be made based on the guidelines established by this Court 
in the previous paragraphs, namely, giving the benefit of the 
doubt to the party against whom the Tax Commission seeks to impose 
a tax. There has been no claim in this case that exempt entities 
are not entitled to an exemption, as long as sales of materials 
were made "to" them. UCA § 59-12-104(2), (8) (1992). 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES OF 
REQUIRING OWNERSHIP BEFORE SALES TAXATION AND PROTECTING THE 
RELIGIOUS/CHARITABLE EXEMPTION. 
There are at least two legislative purposes that must be 
considered in resolving the issues in this case. The first is the 
prerequisite of ownership prior to imposition of Sales taxes. It 
is inconceivable that the Legislature would impose Sales taxes on 
a taxpayer, such as a contractor, that did not have ownership 
-4-
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rights in property purchased. Thus, if a taxpayer merely installs 
property for another or purchases the property as another's agent, 
the Sales tax incidents of the transaction are not governed with 
reference to the installer or agent but rather with reference to 
the principal or the person hiring the installer.2 
Another legislative purpose is found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104(2),(8), which exempts governmental, religious and 
charitable institutions from paying Sales tax on purchases or 
sales of personal property. This statutory right would be totally 
undermined if exempt entities were not permitted to purchase 
construction materials tax free simply because they chose to hire 
a general contractor and amend its contract by change order. 
C. UTAH LAW REQUIRES USERS AND CONSUMERS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TO 
PAY SALES TAX THEREON AND DEFINES A CONSUMER AS THE LAST 
OWNER OF THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO ITS INSTALLATION AND 
CONVERSION TO REAL PROPERTY. 
The concept of a "consumer" is set forth by the sales tax 
provisions of the Utah Code Ann. (1992, unchanged since 1986). 
Section 59-12-103(1)(a) levies a tax on purchasers for the amount 
paid or charged for retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state. Section 59-12-102(9)(a) defines a retailer 
essentially as one "who is selling to the user or consumer and not 
for resale." Section 59-12-103(1)(1) also levies a tax on 
purchasers of tangible personal property stored, used or consumed 
in this state. 
zSee Concrete Products and Ford J, Twaits at Part E infra, holding 
that purchases by an agent for the State would be exempt. 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-58S regulates the imposition of 
Sales taxes upon the purchase of personal property which is 
"converted" into real property by "consumers" of the personal 
property. See also Utah Admin. Code R865-19-42S. A careful 
reading of that Rule demonstrates that the last person to own the 
personal property prior to installation is the consumer of the 
property and bears the burden of the tax, unless, of course, the 
consumer is an exempt entity. 
Rule R865-19-58S of the Utah Admin. Code provides in 
pertinent part: 
1. The person who converts the personal 
property into real property is the consumer of 
the personal property since he is the last one to 
own it as personal property (emphasis added). 
4. Sales of materials to religious or 
charitable institutions and government agencies 
are exempt only if sold as tangible personal 
property and the seller does not install the 
material as an improvement to realty or use it to 
repair real property. 
Based on Rule R865-19-58S(1) cited above, conditional to 
the status of "consumer" is a finding that an entity is the legal 
owner of the materials converted into real property. Installation 
alone does not make a person a consumer. In other words, the term 
"consumer" has no legal significance apart from the separate 
determination of ownership. This Court has made it clear that a 
"consumer" is the one who ultimately receives title and possession 
of the personalty, as are the exempt owners in the case at hand. 
Hardv v. State Tax Commission, 561 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Utah 1977); 
-6-
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Tummurru Trades Incf vf Utah State Tay Commission/ 802 p.2d 715, 
719 (Utah 1990). 
The conclusion that the Tax Commission appears to urge is 
that a contractor is a "consumer" because it physically attaches 
the material to the real property. Such a result would be 
misplaced because it imposes tax upon the last person with a 
wrench instead of the last person in the chain who had the legal 
incidents of ownership prior to conversion to real property, or as 
the Court stated in the cases cited above, the last party to 
obtain title and possession of the personalty. 
Rule R865-19-58S(4), quoted above, also provides that 
sales of materials to tax-exempt institutions are exempt if sold 
as tangible personal property and the supplier or vendor does not 
install the materials as an improvement to realty. In Arco's 
case, suppliers did not install the materials. In any event, Rule 
R865-19-58S(4) provides that if an exempt entity purchases 
materials and the seller does not install them, no Sales tax is 
due. 
D. MATERIALS PURCHASED AND LEGALLY OWNED BY TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES 
ARE FREE FROM SALES TAX NO MATTER WHAT ARRANGEMENT IS MADE 
WITH A CONTRACTOR TO INSTALL THE MATERIALS. 
1. EMPLOYMENT OF CHANGE ORDERS DOES NOT CAUSE PURCHASES BY 
EXEMPT OWNERS TO BE TAXABLE. 
If an exempt owner purchases and installs materials 
itself, there is no question that the purchase is exempt from 
Sales tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2), (8). Moreover, if an 
exempt entity purchases materials and then enters a contract with 
-7-
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a contractor to install the materials, again, no Sales tax is 
imposed on the purchase. X&. 
There should also be no Sales tax incident to an exempt 
entity's purchase of materials in a situation where the entity 
contracts with a contractor to furnish materials but then elects, 
through execution of a change order to the contract, to purchase 
materials itself and then deduct the cost of the materials and 
related Sales tax from the original contract bid. The effect of 
executing a change order is a critical point that should be given 
much more weight than that given by the Tax Commission. 
A change order completely alters the legal relationship 
between the parties and cannot be underestimated in determining 
the outcome of this case. Prior to executing a change order, the 
exempt entity looks to the contractor to furnish materials and 
install them in a completed project. The execution of a change 
order, however, changes the legal arrangement between the parties 
as follows: 
(1) The contractor no longer is responsible to 
purchase the materials listed on the change order; 
(2) The bid price is reduced by the cost of the 
materials plus sales tax thereon; 
(3) The exempt entity is now the purchaser of the 
materials; 
(4) Provisions in the contract imposing various 
duties on the contractor for materials the contractor 
otherwise would have furnished are no longer applicable 
-8-
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and legally cannot be relied on by the exempt owner 
against the contractor; 
(5) The risks and responsibilities of the exempt 
owner have been materially expanded in many ways (see 
also Part D(3) below). 
Legally and practically, an exempt entity's purchases 
through change order are the same as purchases made directly. 
However, the Tax Commission has chosen to make a distinction 
between the two and impose stringent rules upon change order 
purchases. The Tax Commission stance is unfortunate because the 
form of a transaction should not affect the taxable results, so 
long as the substance is present. 
2. IMPOSING CONTRACTUAL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ON 
CONTRACTORS AS TO GOODS PURCHASED BY EXEMPT OWNERS DOES 
NOT AFFECT THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF A SALE. 
The Tax Commission has expressed concern about contracts 
that impose on contractors duties related to materials purchased 
and furnished by exempt owners, such as agreement in advance with 
a contractor to perform ordering, receiving, handling, securing 
and similar duties in connection with the materials. The Tax 
Commission has indicated that these contractual duties may deprive 
an exempt owner's purchase of materials from Sales tax exempt 
status. See Exhibit 3 at 21. In modern day construction 
practice, however, not only are exempt owners prudent in seeking 
help from parties with greater construction expertise and 
resources, but exempt owners could also be dangerously exposed 
absent contractors assuming such contractual duties. If a 
-9-
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contractor defectively installs materials furnished by an exempt 
owner, absent contractual language protecting the exempt owner, 
the contractor might be able to shift the responsibility back to 
the owner. 
Contractual provisions requiring some delegated 
contractor accountability for proper care and use of 
owner-furnished materials attempt to ensure that the contractor 
will perform its duties to install owner-furnished materials as 
responsibly and carefully as with materials furnished and consumed 
by the contractor. These contractual provisions, however, are not 
intended to remove from the exempt owner the risks, prerogatives 
and responsibilities of owning the materials. 
Also, in many cases involving exempt owner purchasers, 
contract provisions meant to cover contractor-furnished materials 
are not intended to apply to exempt-owner furnished materials, 
based on change orders between the parties and the express conduct 
of the parties which further modifies their written contract, 
particularly if that conduct extends over long periods of time. 
A leading treatise on Contracts states: 
[Innumerable cases show that the fact that a 
contract has been put into express words does not 
prevent the meaning and legal operation of those 
words from being affected by process of 
••implication" from the conduct of the parties and 
from surrounding circumstances . . . A promisor, 
even though his promise has been put into clear 
words, can always add to it, modify it or wholly 
replace it by a subsequent tacit agreement, one 
in which his own promises are found wholly by 
inference from conduct other than words. 
Corbin on Contracts § 564 (3d ed. 1979). 
-10-
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This Court has espoused this doctrine. In Eie v. 
St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981), the 
Court stated: 
Though arguably clear on its face, where the 
parties demonstrate by their actions that to them 
the contract meant something quite different, the 
intent of the parties will be enforced. 
See also BullQUgh V. SimS/ 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965); 
Bullfrog Marina v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972). 
BYU agrees with the Tax Commission that an exempt owner 
cannot claim exemption from Sales tax when it in substance is not 
the purchaser and owner of materials, and in effect has merely 
taken steps to give the appearance of ownership without assuming 
the requisite risk of loss. However, there should be a balance. 
Although an exempt owner must possess sufficient benefits and 
burdens to be deemed owner and consumer of the construction 
materials, the Tax Commission must be objective in recognizing 
those benefits and burdens before dismissing them as a mere "paper 
trail." &££ Exhibit 3 at 25. 
A fair and workable interpretation of the exemption 
statute would require that exempt owners demonstrate they are 
owners and consumers of the materials for which no Sales tax is 
paid. BYU believes that a rebuttable presumption of ownership and 
consumption should be made when (1) the contract between the 
exempt owner and contractor authorizes an otherwise 
furnish-and-install contract to be amended by change order, 
(2) the exempt owner executes change orders to reflect the 
-11-
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materials purchased, and (3) the exempt owner executes purchase 
orders and checks for payment on its own stationary and in its own 
name. 
3, WHENEVER AN OWNER BECOMES THE DIRECT PURCHASER OF 
MATERIALS, THE RELATIVE LEGAL DUTIES OF THE OWNER, 
CONTRACTOR AND SELLER ARE CHANGED. 
Whenever an owner purchases materials for a construction 
project by executing purchase orders and signing checks, the legal 
relationships of the parties to the transaction are dramatically 
changed. The owner steps into privity of contract with the 
supplier and at the same time, the contractor ceases to be in 
privity with the supplier. 
The following are some examples of the potential impact 
of these changes. The Uniform Commercial Code may not apply to 
the contract between the contractor and the owner, because the 
contractor's obligation will no longer include the purchased 
goods. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-210 (1990) (UCC applies to 
transactions in goods).3 Thus, a whole array of express and 
implied warranties may no longer apply in the relationship between 
the exempt owner and contractors. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 70A-2-313, -314 and -315 (1990) (express and implied warranties 
under UCC). At the same time, as buyer, the exempt owner will 
^The Tenth Circuit, applying Utah law, held that the UCC applied 
to a construction contract involving the supply of materials. See 
Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115, 1118 
(10th Cir. 1971); accord Pittsburah-Des Moines Steel Co. v. 
Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 579-82 (7th Cir. 1976); 
Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 957-60 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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have those warranty rights in relationship to the supplier of 
goods. 
Counteracting these newly gained rights, an owner who 
becomes a buyer loses rights under the UCC upon accepting the 
goods. S&e. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602. Furthermore, by becoming 
a direct purchaser, the owner may waive other contract rights. By 
giving up (through change order or otherwise) the contract right 
to have the contractor purchase building materials, the owner may 
impliedly waive legal claims or defenses — or be held to be 
partially responsible under Utah's comparative negligence statute 
should the purchased product fail or cause harm. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-27-37, -38, -40 and -43 (1986). 
In sum, when an owner buys its own building materials, 
that transaction has legal significance. To dismiss such 
involvement as a mere "paper trail" (see Exhibit 3 at 25) is to 
ignore the array of legal rights and duties existing between 
owners, contractors and suppliers in building construction. 
E. NONE OF THE CASES DECIDED BY THIS COURT IMPOSE SALES TAX ON 
EXEMPT OWNER PURCHASES OF MATERIALS, WHETHER OR NOT THE 
MATERIALS ARE INSTALLED BY A CONTRACTOR. 
•••'
:v.:\ Numerous decisions of this Court cited below have 
maintained that the consumer of personal property is responsible 
for Sales taxes thereon. However, there is no decision of this 
Court holding that exempt entities which purchased and owned the 
materials at the time of installation were responsible for Sales 
taxes. The key inquiry, therefore, should be whether the exempt 
entity possessed sufficient incidents of ownership to substantiate 
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its claim that it is the consumer of the materials under the 
decisions of this Court. 
The principal case affecting the case at hand is Utah 
Concrete Products Corp, v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 
P.2d 408 (1942)/ in which a contractor purchased materials from a 
vendor for use in a state road construction project pursuant to a 
contract with the State. The Court found that the contractor was 
subject to sales tax even though the contractor's bid included 
sales tax and the State thus paid the tax indirectly through a 
higher bid. Significantly, though, no party made any claim that 
the State had purchased, owned or consumed the materials prior to 
installation. Indeed, the Court specifically found that the 
vendor looked solely to the contractor for its payment and not to 
the State. Moreover, the Court stated that had the State or its 
agent purchased the materials, no Sales tax would have resulted: 
It is true that under this section sales made 
directly by plaintiffs to the state would be 
exempted, but in the instant case the sales are 
to an independent contractor and not to an agent 
of the state. 
125 P.2d 411. 
Thus, the facts of Concrete Products are inapposite to 
the case at hand. Here, an otherwise turnkey contract (as was 
found in Concrete Products) was converted into a contract for 
labor only upon execution of change orders whereby the tax exempt 
owners agreed to furnish materials, and the amount due the 
contractor under the bid was reduced by the cost of the materials 
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and applicable Sales tax. Vendors looked to the tax exempt owners 
to pay for the materials. The exempt owners claimed to be 
purchasers and owners of materials and acted consistent with that 
claim, unlike the facts of Concrete Products. 
None of the progeny of Concrete Products changes the 
preceding analysis in the slightest degree. In Ford J. Twaits 
Company v. Utah State Tax Commission. 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 
(1944), the Court determined that if an independent contractor 
purchases materials Mas an agent for the government," the sale is 
exempt from sales tax. 148 P.2d at 345. Thus, even if the 
contractor in the present case had purchased the materials at 
issue in behalf of the exempt owners, those purchases would 
irrefutably have been exempted because the contractor would have 
purchased them as agent for the tax exempt entity. However, in 
this case, the contractor is not stating that it bought these 
materials as an agent of the tax exempt owners, but rather that it 
did not buy them at all. 
in Qlson Construction CQt v, State Tax Commission/ 12 
Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961), a subcontractor was held to be 
consumer of materials even though title to the materials vested in 
the U.S. Government upon delivery to the job site and the 
subcontractor allocated its bid award between labor and 
materials. However, the subcontractor in Olson took all steps to 
purchase, handle and install the materials, with no involvement by 
the U.S. Government other than its receipt of title prior to 
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installation. In the present case, the exempt owners purchased 
materials and performed the duties of an owner, in addition to 
acquiring title prior to installation. 
In other cases, the Court has resolved the matter by 
determining who consumed materials, or in other words who 
purchased and owned the materials when they were converted into 
real property or otherwise attached to personal property. See, 
e.g., E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 
P.2d 324 (1946); Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164 (1946), modified by 110 
Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947); Ralph Child Construction Co, v. 
State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 (1961); Sine v. 
State Tax Commission, 15 Utah 2d 214, 390 P.2d 130 (1964); 
B.J.-Titan Services v. State Tax Commission, P.2d , 
183 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1992). 
Cases from other states also support the holding sought 
by Arco in this case. For example, in Nevada Tax Commission v. 
Harker & Harker, Inc., 699 P.2d 112 (Nevada 1985), a contractor 
who acted as a conduit through which a city procured materials for 
construction materials did not have sufficient incidents of 
ownership to warrant imposition of a use tax. Likewise, in In 
Matter of Briggs v. Page, 15 A.D.2d 34, 221 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1961), a 
church was held to be the purchaser of materials and thus no sales 
tax was due on the purchase. 
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F. THERE IS NO AUTHORITY FOR IMPOSITION OF USE TAX AGAINST A 
CONTRACTOR WHO INSTALLS PERSONAL PROPERTY PURCHASED BY A TAX-
EXEMPT OWNER, 
The Utah Code requires that tax, equal to the amount of 
the sales tax, be paid for a "use" of tangible personal property 
in this state. Section 59-12-102(14)(a) defines "use" as the 
exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property 
"incident to the ownership or the leasing of that property, item, 
or service" (emphasis added). 
Under Utah law, use tax applies only to property whose 
title was transferred outside of Utah and which was subsequently 
used in Utah, as defined in the statute. Utah Concrete Products 
Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942); 
Utah Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission. 110 Utah 135, 
170 P.2d 164 (1946), modified bv 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 
(1947); Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission. 116 Utah 170, 
209 P.2d 208 (1949).4 
Moreover, as the definition of "use" above specifically 
requires, there can be no use of property absent ownership of the 
property by the persons whose use invokes the tax. Olson 
Construction Company v. State Tax Commission. 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 
p.2d 1112 (1961); Tumrourru Trades, inc, v, Utah State Tax 
Commission. 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990). As a result, no use tax can 
apply to property purchased in Utah and used, stored or consumed 
4Section 59-12-102(14)(a) also deals with leases, but leases are 
not relevant because none are present under the facts of this case. 
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in this state. Any such transaction is either subject to the 
sales tax or is not taxable. A purchase exempt from Sales tax is 
also exempt from use tax. Hardy v. State Tax Commission, 561 P.2d 
1064, 1070 (Utah 1977). 
The Commission attempts to levy a use tax upon Arco which 
allegedly "used" materials furnished it by tax exempt entities but 
which in fact did not purchase the materials outside of Utah or 
obtain title to them in Utah. Because this position is not in 
harmony with the statutes and cases in this State, the Court 
should reject the Tax Commission's use tax theory. 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
Arco did not purchase, own or consume the subject 
materials and thus the assessment of sales or use tax against it 
was improper. Granite School District and the LDS Presiding 
Bishop were the true purchasers, owners and ultimate consumers of 
such materials. Because Granite and the LDS Presiding Bishop 
(like BYU) are tax-exempt entities, such purchases should be 
exempt from Utah sales or use tax. 
DATED this day of August, 1992. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Bruce L. Olson 
Keith A. Kelly 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Brigham 
Young University 
BLOPC+68 
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59-12-102 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 12 Utah 2d 53, land Cement Co. v. State Tax Comm.,-110 
362 P.2d 422 (1961). Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947). 
Purpose of use tax. Redress from assessment. 
The obvious purpose of the former Use Tax Procedure set forth in this chapter itself is 
Act was to impose a tax on the use in this state the exclusive method of seeking redress from 
of property the sale of which, because that sale an assessment. Pacific Intermountain Express 
took place outside the state, was beyond the Co. v. State Tax Comm., 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 
reach of the Utah Sales Tax Act. Union Port- P.2d 549 (1957). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Sales and Cable television equipment or services as 
Use Taxes §§ 1 to 243. subject to sales or use tax, 5 A.L.R.4th 754. 
C.J.S. — 85 C.J S. State and Local Taxation Retailer's failure to pay to government sales 
§§ 1231 to 1257. or use tax funds as constituting larceny or em-
A.L.K. — Sales or use tax on motor vehicle bezzlement, 8 A.L.R.4th 1068. 
purchased out of state, 45 A.L.R.3d 1270. Eyeglasses or other optical accessories as 
Applicability of sales tax to "tips" or service
 s u b j e c t ^ s a l e s o r ^ ^ 1 4 A.L.R.4th 1370. 
charges added in lieu of tips, 73 A.L.R.3d 1226.
 U s e o r p r i v i lege tax on sales of, or revenues 
Sales and use taxes on l e w d tangible per-
 f n ) m g a l e s Q{ a d v e r t i s i n g s p a c e o r s e r v i c e s , 40 
sonal property. 2 A.L.R.4th 859. A L R 4 t h 1114 
Freight, transportation, mailing, or han- • ' • . * , , dling charges billed separately to purchaser of . b a l e s ™ m ™ °? sAal.e p ' ~ i oL 
~ ~ J l -„k;L^ •,* ««u« ^rr,«« . ' o A r n A*U lI*g or customer list, 80 A.L.R.4th 1126. goods subject to sales or use taxes, 2 A.L.R.4th ^
 N u m b e p s _ T a x a t i o n _ 1 2 Q 1 ^ ^ 
59-12-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commercial consumption" means the use connected with trade or 
commerce and includes: 
(a) the use of services or products by retail establishments, hotels, 
moteis, restaurants, warehouses, and other commercial establish-
ments; 
(b) transportation of property by land, water, or air; 
(c) agricultural uses unless specifically exempted under this chap-
ter; and 
(d) real property contracting work. 
(2) "Commission" means the State Tax Commission. 
(3) "Component part" includes: 
(a) poultry, dairy, and other livestock feed, and their components; 
(b) baling ties and twine used in the baling of hay and straw; 
(c) fuel used for providing temperature control of orchards and 
commercial greenhouses doing a majority of their business in whole-
sale sales, and for providing power for off-highway type farm machin-
ery; and 
(d) feed, seeds, and seedlings. 
(4) (a) "Medicine" means: 
(D insulin, syringes, and any medicine prescribed for the treat-
ment of human ailments by a person authorized to prescribe 
treatments and dispensed on prescription filled by a registered 
pharmacist, or supplied to patients by a physician, surgeon, or 
podiatrist; 
(ii) any medicine dispensed to patients in a county or other 
licensed hospital if prescribed for that patient and dispensed by a 
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registered pharmacist or administered under the direction of a 
physician; and 
(iii) any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a physician or 
administered under the direction of a physician or paramedic. 
(b) "Medicine" does not include: 
(i) any auditory, prosthetic, ophthalmic, or ocular device or 
appliance; or 
(ii) any alcoholic beverage. 
(5) "Person" includes any individual, firm, partnership, joint venture, 
association, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, 
this state, any county, city, municipality, district, or other local govern-
mental entity of the state, or any group or combination acting as a unit. 
(6) "Purchase price" means the amount paid or charged for tangible 
personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103(1), excluding only cash discounts taken or any excise tax im-
posed on the purchase price by the federal government. 
(7) "Residential use" means the use in or around a home, apartment 
building, sleeping quarters, and similar facilities or accommodations. 
(8) (a) "Retail sale" means any sale within the state of tangible per-
sonal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12*103(1), other than resale of such property, item, or service by a 
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer. 
(b) "Retail sale" includes sales by any farmer or other agricultural 
producer of poultry, eggs, or dairy products to consumers if the sales 
have an average monthly sales value of $125 or more. 
(9) (a) "Retailer" means any person engaged in a regularly organized 
retail business in tangible personal property or any other taxable 
item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), and who is selling to 
the user or consumer and not for resale. 
(b) "Retailer" includes commission merchants, auctioneers, and 
any person regularly engaged in the business of selling to users or 
consumers within the state. 
(c) "Retailer" includes any person who engages in regular or sys-
tematic solicitation of a consumer market in this state by the distri-
bution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or other advertis-
ing, or by means of print, radio or television media, by mail, 
telegraphy, telephone, computer data base, cable, optic, microwave, 
or other communication system. 
(d) "Retailer" does not include farmers, gardeners, stockmen, 
poultrymen, or other growers or agricultural producers producing 
and doing business on their own premises, except those who are regu-
larly engaged in the business of buying or selling for a profit. 
(e) For purposes of this chapter the commission may regard as 
retailers the following if they determine it is necessary for the effi-
cient administration of this chapter: salesmen, representatives, ped-
dlers, or canvassers as the agents of the dealers, distributors, supervi-
sors, or employers under whom they operate or from whom they ob-
tain the tangible personal property sold by them, irrespective of 
whether they are making sales on their own behalf or on behalf of 
these dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers. 
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59-12-102 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, conditional 
or otherwise, in any manner, of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a consider-
ation. It includes: 
(a) installment and credit sales; 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale; 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or entertainment 
taxable under this chapter; 
(d) any transaction if the possession of property is transferred but 
the seller retains the title as security for the payment of the price; 
and 
(e) any transaction under which right to possession, operation, or 
use of any article of tangible personal property is granted under a 
lease or contract and the transfer of possession would be taxable if an 
outright sale were made. 
(11) "State" means the state of Utah, its departments, and agencies. 
(12) "Storage" means any keeping or retention of tangible personal 
property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103(1), in this state for any purpose except sale in the regular 
course of business. 
(13) (a) 'Tangible personal property" means: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances which are 
dealt in or capable of being possessed or exchanged; 
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other containers; and 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, including 
property severed from real estate, 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest or improvements in real estate; 
(ii) bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, notes, and-other 
evidence of debt; 
(iii) insurance certificates or policies; 
(iv) personal or governmental licenses; 
(v) water in pipes, conduits, ditches, or reservoirs; 
(vi) currency and coinage constituting legal tender of the 
United States or of a foreign nation; and 
(vii) all gold, silver, or platinum ingots, bars, medallions, or 
decorative coins, not constituting legal tender of any nation, with 
a gold, silver, or platinum content of not less than 80%. 
(14) (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or power over tangible 
personal property under Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the 
ownership or the leasing of that property, item, or service. 
(b) "Use" does not include the sale, display, demonstration, or trial 
of that property in the regular course of business and held for resale. 
(15) "Vehicle" means any aircraft, as defined in Section 2-1-1; any ve-
hicle, as defined in Section 41-la-102; any off-highway vehicle, as defined 
in Section 41-22-2; and any vessel, as defined in Section 41-la-102; that is 
required to be titled, registered, or both. 
(16) "Vehicle dealer" means a person engaged in the business of buy-
ing, selling, or exchanging vehicles as defined in Subsection (15). 
(17) "Vendor" means: 
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(a) any person receiving any payment or consideration upon.a sale 
of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service 
under Subsection 59-12-103(1), or to whom such payment or consider-
ation is payable; and 
(b) any person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of 
a consumer market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, peri-
odicals, advertising flyers, or other advertising, or by means of print, 
radio or television media, by mail, telegraphy, telephone, computer 
data base, cable, optic, microwave, or other communication system. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch. 
110, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2; 
L. 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957, 
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, § 1; 1969, ch. 187, 
§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152, 
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1; 
1986, ch. 55, § 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1988, ch. 66, 
§ 1; 1990, ch. 215, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 200. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, added present 
Subsections (15) and (16) and redesignated for-
mer Subsection (15) as Subsection (17). 
The 1990 amendment, effective July 1, 1990, 
subdivided Subsection (9), adding Subsection 
(c) and making stylistic changes, and in Sub-
section (17) added the subsection designation 





Discharge of tax. 
Liability for tax. 
Lease or contract. 
Manufacturing equipment. 
Material for parent corporation. 
Nonresident purchaser. 
Nonresident seller. 





Tangible personal property. 
Transfer of title. 
"Use." 
Users or consumers. 
Use tax relationship to sales tax. 
Wholesale purchases. 
Construction. 
This section and § 59-12-103 are correlative 
and complementary. Barrett Inv. Co. v. State 
Tax Comm.. 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998 
The 1992 amendment, effective January 30, 
1992, in Subsection (15) substituted the code 
citations to § 41-la-102 for "Section 41-1-1" 
and "Section 41-1-147" respectively, and made 
stylistic changes. 
Legislative Intent. — Laws 1990, ch. 215, 
§ 3 provides: "The Legislature intends to make 
the changes in the definition and status of re-
tailers and vendors under this act prospective 
only. It also intends that these changes may 
not be construed to require retailers, as defined 
in Subsection 59-12-102(9)(c), and vendors, as 
defined in Subsection 59-12-102(17)(b), to pay 
or collect and remit any sales or use tax that 
may have been otherwise due and payable be-
fore July 1, 1990." 
Cross-References. — State Tax Commis-
sion, § 59-1-201 et seq. 
(1964); Ogden Union Ry. & Depot v. State Tax 
Comm., 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964). 
Construction contracts. 
Sales of products made by a manufacturer of 
building materials to contractors for use upon 
a private construction contract are taxable un-
der the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 (now 
this chapter) and subsequent amendments. 
Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm., 101 Utah 513. 125 P.2d 408 (1942). 
Sales of personal property to a contractor 
constructing facilities for the federal govern-
ment were not exempt from sales tax, even 
though the contracts involved provided for the 
vesting of title to all material in the federal 
government upon deliver}' to the job site and 
even though there was in existence at the time 
the contracts were executed a sales tax regula-
tion of the commission which provided a sales 
tax exemption contrary to law. Olson Constr. 
Co. v. State Tax Comm., 12 Utah 2d 42. 361 
P.2d 1112 (1961). 
Discharge of tax. 
Tax may be discharged by payment to re-
tailer from whom goods are purchased. Ford J. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
389 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
59-12-103 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
deemed wholesale purchases and exempt from 
the sales tax. Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax 
Comm., 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998 (1964). 
59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate. 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state; 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to telephone or telegraph corpo-
rations, whether the corporations are municipally or privately owned, for: 
(i) all transportation; 
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or 
(iii) telegraph service; 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for commercial consumption; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, 
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar ac-
commodations; 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or 
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other 
tangible personal property; 
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property; 
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and ser-
vices for less than 30 consecutive days; 
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs 
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property 
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection 
(1) shall be: 
(a) 53/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be: 
(a) 23/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 2% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(4) (a) From January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1999, there shall be 
deposited in an Olympics special revenue fund or funds as determined by 
the Division of Finance under Section 51-5-4, for the use of the Utah 
Sports Authority created under Title 9, Chapter 1, Part 3, Utah Sports 
Authority Act: 
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a lA$4% tax rate on 
the taxable items and services under Subsection (1); 
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a lA>4% tax rate under 
Section 59-12-204 on the taxable items and services under Subsection 
(1); and 
(iii) interest earned on the amounts under Subsections (i) and (ii). 
(b) These funds shall be used by the Utah Sports Authority as follows: 3 Q 9 
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(i) to the extent funds are available, to transfer directly to a debt 
service fund or to otherwise reimburse to the state of Utah any 
amount expended on debt service or any other cost of any bonds 
issued by the state to construct any public sports facility as defined in 
Section 9-1-303; and 
(ii) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, administrative, 
legal, and other expenses of the Utah Sports Authority, but not in-
cluding protocol expenses for seeking and obtaining the right to host 
the Winter Olympic Games. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch. 
110, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2; 
L. 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957, 
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, § 1; 1969, ch. 187, 
§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152, 
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1; 
1986, ch. 55, § 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1989, ch. 41, 
§ 6; 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 5, § 5; 1990, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1990, ch. 171, § 1; 1991, ch. 152, § 1; 
1992, ch. 241, § 370. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted 
,f5V64%" for "5%" in Subsection (2Kb); substi-
tuted "2Ve4%" for "2%" in Subsection (3)(b); and 
added Subsection (4). 
The 1989 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effective 
October 10,1989, substituted "5%" for "5 l/w%" 
in Subsection (2Kb); substituted "2%" for "2 
l/s4%" in Subsection (3)(b); subdivided Subsec-
tion (4) and rewrote the introductory language 
of Subsection (4)(a), which read: "For fiscal 
year beginning July 1, 1990, there is appropri-
ated to the entity created under Subsection 
11-13-5.5(4)"; substituted "1/54<7C" for "lh2%" in 
two places in Subsection (4)(a)(i); and added 
Subsections (4)(a)(ii) and (4)(b)(i) and (ii). 






Dental materials purchased by practitioners. 
Exemption from tax. 
Fractional sales. 
Fuel oil used by railroad. 
Industrial coal. 
Items furnished by motel to guests. 
Laundry service. 
Liability of consumer for tax. 
Municipally owned electric plants. 
Natural gas pipeline. 
Private clubs. 
I March 9, 1990, rewrote Subsection (4)(a)(i), 
which had read "the amount of sales and use 
tax generated by 1/64% of the tax levied under 
Subsection (2Kb) and 1/64% of the tax levied 
under Subsection (3)(b)" and Subsection 
<4)(a)(ii), which had read "the amount of reve-
nue generated by 1/64% of the local option tax 
• as provided in Subsection 59-12-205(4)," and 
inserted "administrative, legal" in Subsection 
(4)(b)(ii). 
 The 1990 amendment by ch. 22, effective 
July 1, 1990, subdivided Subsection (1Kb); de-
 leted "as defined by Section 54-2-1" after "tele-
1 graph corporations" in paragraph of Subsection 
(1Kb); and added "intrastate" at the beginning 
1 of Subsection UXbXii). 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
? 1991, inserted "Utah Sports Authority Act" in 
' Subsection (4)(a), and added Subsection* 
I (4)(a)(iii). 
The 1992 amendment, effective March 13, 
; 1992, substituted the reference to Title 9, 
1 Chapter 1, Part 3 for a reference to Title 62, 
Chapter 1 in Subsection (4Ma) and the refer-
l ence to § 9-1-303 for a reference to § 62-1-102 
i in Subsection i4)(b)(D. 
1 Cross-References. — County or municipal 
sales and use tax, provisions of ordinance, 
5 § 59-12-204. 
Purchase of coal. 
Purchase price. 
Railroad services. 
Rare and foreign coins. 
Repair sales. 
Sale in sister state. 
Sales of artificial limbs. 
Tourist accommodations and services. 
Transportation. 
Valuation of trade-ins. 
Vendor's duty to collect tax. 
Constitutionality. 
Subsections «l)(c) and (l)(d) have been held 
to be constitutional against various conten-
tions. State Tax Comm. v. City of Logan, 88 
Utah 406. 54 P.2d 1197 (1936). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-104 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am- JUT. 2d, — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Sales and C.J.S. — 85 C J.S. State and Local Taxation 
Use Taxes §§ 128 to 138, 230, 231. § 1245. 
Key Numbers. — Taxation *» 1231 et seq. 
59-12-104. Exemptions. 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this 
chapter: 
(1) sales of motor fuels and special fuels subject to a Utah state excise 
tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax Act; 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political subdivisions; 
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending machines 
in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the vendor or 
operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 120% of the 
cost of items as goods consumed;. 
(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar confections, and re-
lated services to commercial airline carriers for in-flight consumption; 
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft operated by com-
mon carriers in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, prerecorded audio pro-
gram tapes or records, and prerecorded video tapes by a producer, distrib-
utor, or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or commercial 
television or radio broadcaster; 
(7) sales made through coin-operated laundry machines, coin-operated 
dry cleaning machines, or coin-operated car washes; 
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the con-
duct of their regular religious or charitable functions and activities and, 
after July 1,1993, if the requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are fulfilled; 
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the motor 
vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this 
state and are not afterwards registered or used in this state except as 
necessary to transport them to the borders of this state; 
(10) sales of medicine; 
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services used in the con-
struction of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed by Sec-
tions 19-2-123 through 19-2-127; 
(12) sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of 
this state; 
(13) sales of meals served by: 
(a) public elementary and secondary schools; 
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and institutions of higher ed-
ucation, if the meals are not available to the general public; and 
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities; 
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in 
business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled or 
registered under the laws of this state; 
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by 
a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding normal 
operating replacements, which includes replacement .machinery and 
Q Q 7 
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59-12-104 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity, 
as determined by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah. 
Manufacturing facility means an establishment described in SIC Codes 
2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of 
the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, For purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule 
define "new or expanding operations" and "establishment." By October 1, 
1991, and every five years thereafter, the commission shall review this 
exemption and make recommendations to the Revenue and Taxation In-
terim Committee concerning whether the exemption should be continued, 
modified, or repealed. In its report to the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee, the tax commission review shall include at least: 
(a) the cost of the exemption; 
(b) the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and 
(c) the benefits of the exemption to the state; 
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support equipment, and special 
test equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of any 
aerospace or electronics industry contract with the United States govern-
ment or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the terms 
of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment is 
vested in the United States government as evidenced by a government 
identification tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a 
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical; 
(17) intrastate movements of freight and express or street railway 
fares;-
(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions; 
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full or 
part payment of the purchase price, except that for purposes of calculat-
ing sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins 
are limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon the then 
existing fair market value of the vehicle being sold and the vehicle being 
traded in, as determined by the commission; 
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and weeds 
for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal 
products; 
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily 
and directly in farming operations, including sales of irrigation equip-
ment and supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether or 
not they become part of real estate and whether or not installed by 
farmer, contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of: 
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used in a man-
ner that is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with a unit 
purchase price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial 
equipment and supplies; 
(b) tangible personal property used in any activities other than 
farming, such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and sup-
plies used in sales or distribution of farm products, in research, or in 
transportation; or 
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state, 
without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put; 
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SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-104 
(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden, farm, or other 
agricultural produce if sold by the producer; 
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps; 
(24) any container, label, shipping case, or, in the case of meat or meat 
products, any casing; 
(25) property stored in the state for resale; 
(26) property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her own 
personal use or enjoyment while within the state, except property pur-
chased for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at the 
time of purchase; 
(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular course of 
business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or component part 
of a manufactured or compounded product; 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to some other 
state, or one of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any 
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part and Part 
2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the tax 
imposed by this part and Part 2; 
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 59-12-103(l)(b), (c), 
and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable under the 
subsections; 
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC program of the United 
States Department of Agriculture; 
(31) sales or leases made after July 1, 1987, and before June 30,, 1994, 
of rolls, rollers, refractory brick, electric motors, and other replacement 
parts used in the furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill described in 
SIC Code 3312 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of 
the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, but only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah facility pur-
chased and reopened for the production of steel: 
132) sales of boats of a type required to be registered under Title 73, 
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors which 
are made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are not thereafter 
registered or used in this state except as necessary to transport them to 
the borders of this state: 
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state 
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated pursuant 
to contract into and becomes a part of real property located outside of this 
state, except to the extent that the other state or political entity imposes a 
sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax on it 
against which the other state or political entity allows a credit for taxes 
imposed by this chapter: 
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and use 
outside Utah where a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the title is 
passed in Utah: and 
(35) until July L 1999, amounts paid for purchase of telephone service 
for purposes of providing telephone service. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63. $ 6: 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1: 1939, ch. 103, $ 1: C. 1943, 
80-15-6; 1945, ch. 110, $ 1; 1957, ch. 126, § 1; 
1957, ch. 127, 8 1; 1965, ch. 128, S 1; 1967, 
ch. 162, 8 1: 1969, ch. 187, $ 3; 1969 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 14. 8 3; 1973, ch. 42, 8 9; 1973, ch. 
154. * 1; 1975, ch. 179. $ 2; 1976, ch. 28, § 1: 
1979, ch. 195, 8 1; 1981, ch. 238, § 1; 1981, 
."»/>/"! 
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R865-19-42S. Sales to The State of Utah and Its 
Subdivisions Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tion 59-12-104. 
A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its departments 
and institutions or to its political subdivisions such as 
counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage 
districts, irrigation districts, and metropolitan water 
districts are exempt from tax if such property for use 
in the exercise of an essential governmental function. 
If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn upon the 
state treasurer or the official disbursing agent of any 
political subdivision, the sale is considered as being 
made to the state of Utah or its political subdivisions 
and exempt from tax. 
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R865-19-58S. Materials and Supplies Sold to 
Owners, Contractors and Repairmen of Real 
Property Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 
59-12-102 and 59-12-103. 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real prop-
erty contractors and repairmen of real property is 
generally subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal property 
into real property is the consumer of the personal 
property since he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or 
repair real property; regardless of the type of contract 
entered into—whether it is a lump sum, time and 
material, or a cost-plus contract. 
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the tax 
nor is the labor performed on real property. For ex-
ample, the sale of a completed home or building is not 
subject to the tax, but sales of materials and supplies 
to contractors and subcontractors are taxable trans-
actions as sales to final consumers. This is true 
whether the contract is performed for an individual, a 
religious institution, or a governmental instrumen-
tality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable in-
stitutions and government agencies are exempt only 
if sold as tangible personal property and the seller 
does not install -the material as an improvement to 
realty or use it to repair real property. 
B. If the contractor or repairman purchases all ma-
terials and supplies from vendors who collect the 
Utah tax, no sales tax license is required unless the 
contractor makes direct sales of tangible personal 
property in addition to the work on real property. 
1. If direct sales are made, the contractor shall ob-
tain a sales tax license and collect tax on all sales of 
tangible personal property to final consumers. 
2. The contractor must accrue and report tax on all 
merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing 
contracts to improve or repair real property. Books 
and records must be kept to account for both material 
sold and material consumed. 
C. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors 
for use in out-of-state jobs are taxable unless sold in 
interstate commerce in accordance with Rule 
R865-19-44S. 
D. This rule does not apply.to contracts whereby 
the retailer sells and installs personal property which 
does not become part of the real property. See Rules 
DOCC i n e i o n a ^ e i n e n c __J T»o<?e m noo /•__ :_ 
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BRUCE L. OLSON (A24 68) and 
KEITH A. KELLY (A4748) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Layton Construction 
Co. and Amicus Curiae 
Brigham Young University 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 




UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
WRITTEN CONSENT OF ALL 
PARTIES TO FILING OF AMICUS 
CURIAE BRIEF BY BRIGHAM 
YOUNG UNIVERSITY AND 
STIPULATION TO FILING DATE 
Case No. 920182 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 25 and 
50(f), Petitioner Arco Electric and Respondent Utah State Tax 
Commission, through their counsel, hereby consent to allow Brigham 
Young University ["BYU"] to file an Amicus Curiae Brief in this 
matter. Also pursuant to Rules 25 and 50(f), the parties 
stipulate that BYU may have through August 14, 1992, to file its 
Amicus Curiae Brief. 
This Written Consent is intended to replace the prior 
Amicus Curiae Written Consent, dated August 6, 1992. BYU is 
substituted for its contractor, Layton Construction Co., because 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BYU is the nonprofit entity which is the real party in interest as 
to this appeal. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 1992. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
ul Van Dam 7 
Clark L. Snelson 
John C. McCarey 
Attorneys for Respondent Utah State 
Tax Commission 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN 
<r £ 
Graham Dodd 
Robert P. Lunt 
Attorneys for Petitioner Arco 
Electric and Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints, a Utah Corporation Sole 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Tl^ omas Christensen, Jr. 
lohn E. S. Robson 
Attorneys for Petitioner Arco 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ARCO ELECTRIC, ) 
Petitioner, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
v. ) AND FINAL DECISION 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) Appeal No. 87-1276 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on August 27, 28 and 29, 1991. G. Blaine 
Davis, Administrative Law Judge, Presiding Officer, heard the 
matter for and on behalf of the Commission. Joe B. Pacheco, 
Commissioner was present and heard the case on August 27, and 
28, 1991. S. Blaine Willes, Commissioner, was present and 
heard the case on August 28 and 29, 1991. Present and 
representing the Petitioner was Dudley Amoss, Attorney at Law. 
Present and representing Utah Transit Authority were Gayle F. 
McKeachnie, Attorney at Law, of the firm McKeachnie and Allred, 
and William D. Oswald, Attorney at Law. Present and 
representing the Granite School District was Thomas 
Christensen, Jr., Attorney at Law, of the firm Fabian and 
Clendenin. Present and representing the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints were Graham Dodd and Robert P. Lunt, 
Attorneys at Law, of the firm Kirton, McConkie and Poelman. 
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Appeal No. 87-1276 
Present and representing the Respondent was Clark Snelson, 
Assistant Utah Attorney General. 
This proceeding involves an audit which was performed 
by Respondent upon Petitioner for the years in question. The 
audit involved construction projects for three separate 
entities. Those projects were the Utah Transit Authority's 
facilities at its Northern Division at 135 West 17th Street, 
Ogden, Utah; Granite School District's Westbrook Elementary 
School at 6200 South 3500 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
Valley Crest Elementary School at 3100 South 5300 West, Salt 
Lake City, Utah; and the Printing Center for the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints at 1980 West Industrial 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
All of the construction projects were handled on 
different contracts, and were therefore legally 
distinguishable. The projects for each owner or exempt entity 
were therefore heard as separate proceedings on three different 
days. However, because there was just one< single audit 
performed on Petitioner, and because the audit was appealed as 
a single case number, all of those matters will be decided 
herein. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Facts Regarding Utah Transit Authority 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is January l, 1982 to 
March 31, 1987. 
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3. The tlta&f? transit .Authority is a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, created under the Utah Public 
Transit District Act found at Utah Code Sec. 17A-2-1001 et. seq. 
4. The Utah Transit Authority entered into a 
contract directly with ARCO Electric on September 27, 1985. 
5. The contract between Utah Transit Authority and 
ARCO Electric contained a provision which required ARCO 
Electric to "furnish labor, supervision, equipment, supplies 
and materials'1 in connection with the construction of the Utah 
Transit Authority's facilities at its Northern Division. 
6. The low bid for materials and labor was 
$707,156.00. It was broken down as $427,400.00 for materials 
and $279,756.00 for labor. The original contract between the 
Utah Transit Authority and ARCO was $279,756.00. 
7. Because of changes to the original contract, the 
final payment to ARCO Electric was $294,762.78. These changes 
were to reflect additional work required of ARCO. 
8. The Utah Transit Authority hired Jacobsen 
Construction as the Construction manager at the site, with 
Kevin Brown, an employee of Jacobsen Construction, as its 
on-site Project Manager at the Ogden facility where- ARCO 
performed the work covered by the contract. 
9. Paragraph 5 on page 3 of the Construction 
Management contract between the Utah Transit Authority and 
Jacobsen Construction required that; 
"All tangible personal property used in the 
construction of the Northern Division Facility 
will be purchased by CM acting as agent of Owner 
it 
.... 
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10. Procurement*^6i^i^ter^»ti^to^mth^:-.Ogden f aci 1 ity 
was initiated by the issuance of Utah Transit Authority 
purchase orders by Jacobsen Construction's project manager, 
Kevin Brown. 
11. Precontract bids obtained through public bidding 
determined where materials for the project would be obtained. 
12. Approximately twenty (20) open purchase orders 
were issued by Utah Transit Authority to individual vendors for 
the materials needed at the facility. 
13. The Utah Transit Authority arranged with each 
vendor to purchase the goods, to have the goods delivered to 
Utah Transit Authority property, and used a Utah Transit 
Authority check to pay for the goods referencing the assigned 
purchase order number. 
14. Vendors then set up a customer file on the Utah 
Transit Authority Ogden facility, using one or more open 
purchase orders for all subsequent purchases. 
15. The terms of the purchase orders issued by the 
Utah Transit Authority to each vendor required the Utah Transit 
Authority to pay for materials and any freight charges either 
as part of the purchase price or as a separate item. 
16. The purchase order included the following 
language: 
UTAH SALES TAX DOES NOT APPLY 
Utah Transit Authority is exempt from 
" all State Sales and use taxes under 
Sec. 11-20-55 of the laws of Utah and 
from Federal excise taxes under 
exemption No. 87-70-0023-K. 
-4-
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17. The contract between ARCO and the Utah Transit 
Authority contains language as follows: 
6.1 Sales and Use Tax: Contractor 
acknowledges that Authority is a 
public entity exempt from the payment 
of all Utah sales and use taxes and 
covenants and agrees that it will 
cooperate with Authority in helping 
Authority to legally avoid the Utah 
sales and use taxes on the project. 
18. The open purchase orders were very non-specific 
and did not specify the individual items of materials to be 
provided. When those items were billed, especially the items 
billed by General Electric Supply Company the invoices were 
billed to ARCO Electric and not to the Utah Transit Authority. 
Frequently the purchase orders were not issued until after the 
materials and invoices had already been received, and then 
Petitioner would send a letter to Jacobsen Construction (not 
the Utah Transit Authority) requesting that Jacobsen 
Construction issue a purchase order. The substance was that 
Jacobsen Construction was creating the paper trail for the Utah 
Transit Authority. (See Exhibits M, N, 0, P and Q). 
19. The Utah Transit Authority purchased insurance to 
cover any Loss, due to fire or other loss or damage to materials 
purchased by the Utah Transit Authority. 
20. When damages occurred to property purchased by 
Utah Transit Authority on the project the Utah Transit 
Authority notified its insurance carrier of the claim, and 
obtained replacement materials from the suppliers. 
-5-
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21. ARCO Electric did not issue any purchase order 
for materials or make payment for materials included in the 
audit. 
22. Materials ordered under Utah Transit Authority 
purchase orders were delivered to the Ogden Utah Transit 
Authority site in Ogden, Utah, unless otherwise specified. 
23. Since 1979, the Utah Transit Authority has had on 
going communications with the staff of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, Auditing Division, with reference to its purchases 
of material for real property construction qualifying for the 
tax exempt status. 
24. On August 15, 1979, William D. Oswald, Legal 
Counsel for the Utah Transit Authority, met with Donald R. 
Bosch, Assistant Chief Auditor Utah State Tax Commission, and 
Joe Zvonek, his assistant, to review procedures which the Utah 
Transit Authority intended to follow. 
25. At that meeting, Mr. Bosch and Mr. Zvonek 
outlined for Mr. Oswald the Tax Commission's requirements for 
purchasing the materials for Utah Transit Authority projects to 
ensure that the purchases were tax exempt. 
26. Later, a question arose on the procedures being 
used by the Utah Transit Authority on a contract with Allen 
Steel Company. Mr. Oswald met again with Don R. Bosch on 
February 2, 1982 to review the procedures. 
27. ...Mr. Oswald confirmed his understanding of what 
was said at the February 2, 1982 meeting with a letter dated 
February 9, 1982. Mr. Bosch did not respond to that letter and 
did not communicate or in any way indicate to Mr. Oswald that Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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his^  understanding as stated- in the letter was not correct. 
Facts Regarding Granite School District 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is January 1, 1982 to 
March 31, 1987. 
3- Granite School District is a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah. 
4. Westbrook Elementary School and Valley Crest 
Elementary School were constructed pursuant to an agreement 
between the Granite Board of Education (owner) and Broderick & 
Howell Construction Company (the contractor) dated July 18, 
1984 (the "Agreement"). 
5. The contractor was selected by Granite as the 
general contractor after submission of bids by Broderick & 
Howell and other contractors for the construction of the two 
school buildings. 
6. The right of the owner to furnish materials and 
equipment used in the construction of the two school buildings 
is set forth in the Supplementary General Conditions which were 
made available to all general contractor and subcontractor 
bidders on the project prior to the actual bidding process, 
which provided, substantially as follows: 
a. The bid price submitted by the contractor included 
all labor, plant, materials, equipment, 
transportation, services and any other items required 
for construction and completion of the project. 
b. It was mandatory for the contractor and 
subcontractors to allow the owner to purchase directly 
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equipment which would become a part of the permanent 
structure. 
c. The contractor would negotiate, and administer all 
direct purchases by the owner and furnish to the owner 
a description, source of supply and other information 
necessary to enable the owner to purchase directly the 
materials and equipment. 
d. Purchases by the owner were to be made on 
requisition or purchase orders furnished by the owner 
and signed by the duly authorized purchasing agent of 
the owner. 
e. Title to all materials and equipment purchased by 
the owner was to pass from the vendor directly to the 
owner upon delivery to the job site without any 
vesting in the contractor. 
f. After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, theft, 
vandalism, or destruction of or to such materials and 
equipment purchased directly by the owner were to lie 
with the contractor. 
g. Storage of any materials and equipment furnished 
by the owner were to be the responsibility of the 
contractor. 
h. The contractor was required to hold the owner 
harmless of and from any failure of the materials or 
equipment purchased by the owner which resulted in any 
loss, claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in delivery or 
any problem relating to the materials or equipment. 
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i. The contractor was required to acknowledge receipt 
and approval of any materials or equipment purchased 
directly by the owner by signing the invoice for those 
materials or equipment. 
j. The owner was required to make payment for those 
materials and equipment within a reasonable time after 
the receipt of the signed invoice from the contractor, 
k. The owner was not responsible for the loss of any 
prompt payment discount from the purchase price if the 
owner made payment within ten business days following 
the receipt of the signed invoice from the contractor. 
1. The contract price was reduced by the amount 
actually paid by the owner for the materials and 
equipment purchased directly by the owner and by the 
sales tax which would have been paid on such materials 
and equipment had they been supplied by the 
contractor. Similarly, the amount of any progress 
payment was adjusted to reflect the direct purchase of 
any materials and equipment by the owner. 
m. The owner was not responsible for the loss or 
reduction of any trade discounts. Such loss, or 
reduction of trade discounts would be charged to the 
contractor. 
n. All bonds and insurance called for in the 
Construction Agreement remained in full force. There 
was no reduction in the amount of coverage or any 
deduction for premiums for those bonds and insurance. 
o. The provisions for direct purchase by the owner of 
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materials and equipment did not relieve the contractor 
of any of its duties or obligations under the contract 
or constitute a waiver of any of the owner's rights. 
7. Arco Electric, the Petitioner in this matter was 
a subcontractor of Broderick & Howell Construction Company and 
performed electrical subcontract work pursuant to two separate 
Subcontract Agreements with Broderick & Howell, one for 
Westbrook Elementary and the second for Valley Crest 
Elementary, both dated August 6, 1984. Both Subcontract 
Agreements are identical. 
8. The General and Supplementary Conditions between 
Granite and Broderick and Howell were incorporated into the 
subcontract agreements between Petitioner and Broderick and 
Howell by reference. 
9. The subcontract agreements granted to the owner 
the right to furnish any part or all of the materials and 
equipment which would become part of the permanent structure of 
the school buildings. 
10. Pursuant to those provisions, the owner elected 
to furnish certain electrical materials and equipment 
incorporated into the elementary school building facilities by 
Petitioner pursuant to its agreement with Broderick & Howell. 
11. Materials and equipment incorporated into the 
elementary school facilities which were not furnished by the 
owner were furnished by Petitioner or Broderick & Howell and 
sales tax was paid on those materials. 
12. With respect to materials and equipment elected 
to be furnished by the owner, Broderick & Howell would prepare 
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and deliver to the owner a requisition form identifying 
materials and equipment and the suppliers of the materials and 
equipment. 
13. When the requisition form was received by the 
owner, a purchase order was then issued by the owner to the 
approved supplier of the materials and equipment identified in 
the requisition form. 
14. When the materials and equipment were delivered 
to the job site address, the supplier sent an invoice for the 
materials and equipment to the owner in care of the contractor 
for approval and payment. 
15. The authorized agent of the contractor would 
acknowledge receipt and approval of the materials and equipment 
identified in the invoice by signing the invoice and then 
forwarding it to the owner for payment. 
16. Once approved for payment, the invoice would then 
be paid by the owner to the supplier by check drawn on the 
operating account of the owner by the disbursing agent of the 
owner. 
17. After the owner had made payment for the 
materials and equipment, a change order to the original 
agreement with the contractor would then be executed giving the 
owner credit under the agreement for the cost of the materials 
and equipment plus the sales tax savings associated with the 
materials and equipment. 
18. M.H.T. Architects, Inc. ("M.H.T."), was employed 
by the owner to provide various professional services with 
-11-
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respect to the construction of the two elementary school 
facilities, including the observation of installation and 
construction efforts, testing of material and approval of 
change orders. 
19. M.H.T. had no contractual relationship with the 
contractor or Petitioner. 
20. At all times during the installation and 
construction process the owner maintained a general liability 
insurance policy covering among other things, theft, vandalism 
and casualty losses from materials and equipment purchased by 
the owner and used in the construction of the elementary school 
facilities. 
21. the owner also maintained a fire and extended 
coverage insurance policy in the amount of the insurable value 
of the facilities. 
22. Lien waivers were secured by the contractor with 
respect to materials and equipment furnished by Petitioner or 
the contractor. 
23. Lien waivers were not secured by the contractor 
or Petitioner with respect to materials and equipment furnished 
by the owner. The owner's cancelled checks were accepted in 
place of lien waivers. 
24. Any excess materials were the property of the 
owner. 
Facts Regarding Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints Print Center 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
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2. The period in question is January 1, 1982 to 
March 31, 1987. 
3. In 1986, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (The MChurchM or "Owner") entered into a contract with 
Interwest Construction Company (MInterwest") to construct a 
printing center (the "Print Center"). 
4. As part of the construction of the Print Center, 
Interwest subcontracted with the Petitioner, ARCO Electric 
(MARCOM) to work on the electrical system required by the Print 
Center. 
5. Under its subcontract, ARCO was subject to the 
same general terms and conditions as the general contractor, 
Interwest. 
6. The general requirements of the contract with 
Interwest required the Petitioner to provide at its expense all 
materials, labor, equipment, tools, transportation and 
utilities, including the costs of connection necessary for the 
successful completion of the project. 
7. The contract also contemplated that some of the 
Print Center materials to be installed would be furnished by 
the owner. 
8. The contract required the Petitioner to install 
certain items furnished by the owner, and to receive and store 
in safe condition certain other items which were to be 
purchased directly by the owner. 
9. The contract provided for direct purchase of a 
waste collection system which would be delivered by the owner 
f.o.b. job site. Pursuant to the contract the Petitioner was 
to receive the equipment and be responsible for its protection 
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and proper installation. After receipt of the equipment, the 
contractor's responsibilities were the same as if they had 
negotiated the purchase. 
10. The Church reserved the right in the contract to 
purchase materials to be used in the construction of the Print 
Center. Those purchases were handled as follows: 
a. The owner and the Petitioner would mutually 
agree which materials were to be purchased by the 
Owner. 
b. The cost of those materials, together with 
the amount the Petitioner would have paid as 
sales tax, were to be deducted from the contract 
sum as specified by change order, unless the 
materials were specifically deleted from the 
contract. 
c. Upon agreement between the owner and the 
Petitioner regarding the materials the owner was 
to purchase, the contractor would furnish the 
owner the necessary information, including source 
of supply, to enable the owner to purchase the 
materials, 
d. The Petitioner was required to hold the owner 
harmless of and from any failure of the supplies 
or materials so purchased resulting in any loss, 
claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in delivery, or 
any other problem relating to the materials, 
except where any failure was directly caused by 
acts or omissions of the owner. 
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e. All bonds and insurance called for in the 
contract were required to remain in full force. 
There was to be no reduction in the amount of 
coverage or any deduction for premiums for said 
bonds and insurance. 
f. Materials ordered by the owner were not to be 
paid for until written approval was given by the 
contractor. 
g. These conditions* which applied to owner 
provided materials did not abrogate the 
Petitioner's responsibility to comply fully in 
the execution of the work as required by the 
contract documents. 
h. The Petitioner was required to receive all 
merchandise, inspect it, and be fully responsible 
to see that it met the specifications, and assure 
that its storage and installation gave the owner 
a completed product according to the intention of 
the contract. 
11. "Change Orders," were permitted by the contract. 
12. The Church employed Robert Haywood as its 
"Project Representative." (That term is defined in the General 
Conditions as: "That individual designated by the . . . owner 
as it's full time representative on the project during 
construction." 
13. The project representative was a full-time Church 
employee whose duties included insuring that the Print Center 
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materials in the possession of ARCO were handled in accordance 
with the contract. 
14. The contract required the Petitioner to receive 
and store any materials purchased under the owner purchase 
option. This obligation included providing sheds for the 
storage of any material subject to weather damage and securing 
the work and materials each night. 
15. The Church exercised its option to furnish Print 
Center materials in connection with the work of ARCO electric. 
16. The Church, through its project representative, 
secured material lists from ARCO and consulted with ARCO and 
Interwest regarding the materials ARCO needed to perform its 
work. 
17. A purchase order was then prepared by ARCO which 
was reviewed and approved by ARCO, Interwest, the project 
representative and Church Purchasing for accuracy and 
compliance with the contract terms. Thereafter, if everything 
was found to be proper, a purchase order was issued directly by 
the Purchasing Department of the Church to the appropriate 
vendor. 
18. With one exception, the vendors were instructed 
to send the Print Center materials to the Print Center. The 
Petitioner, and not the Church, had the responsibility to 
receive and inspect these materials. The Print Center 
materials were also inspected by the Church's project 
representative. 
19. In accordance with the instructions on the Church 
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purchase orders, the vendors billed the Church directly for the 
Print Center materials. 
20. The invoices were received and checked by the 
Church, then forwarded to ARCO, which verified the 
appropriateness of payment and then re-forwarded the invoices 
to Interwest for its verification and approval. 
21. Upon receiving the vendor's bill back from 
Interwest, with verification from the project representative 
that the Print Center materials appeared to be in conformance 
with the contract and purchase order, and written approval from 
the contractor, the Church made payment for the Print Center 
materials directly to the vendor. 
22. Title to the Print Center materials passed 
directly from the vendor to the Church. 
23. The vendors looked to the Church, not to ARCO or 
Interwest for payment. 
24. Change orders were issued crediting the owner for 
payments made to suppliers. 
25. Under this procedure suppliers were paid timely. 
The standard 10% contract retainage was not withheld on 
materials purchased by the Church. 
26. All warranties on the Print Center materials were 
obtained by the Petitioner in favor of the owner. 
27. The contract required the Church to provide a 
Builders Risk Policy insuring both ARCO and the Church which 
contained provisions to: 
a. Insure against all risk of direct physical 
loss of, or damage to, the property covered from 
any external cause. 
-17-
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b. All claims for loss or expense arising out of 
any one occurrence were to be adjusted as one 
claim, and from the amount of such adjusted claim, 
there was to be deducted the sum of $350.00 from 
loss resulting from the perils of fire, lightning, 
extended coverages and vandalism, and malicious 
mischief. There was also deducted the sum of 
$1,000.00 from any other covered peril. (The 
deductible amounts were the responsibility of the 
Contractor or subcontractor.) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Sales made to the state, its institutions, and 
its political subdivisions are exempt from sales and use 
taxes. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(2).) 
2. Sales made to or by religious or charitable 
institutions in the conduct of their regular religious or 
charitable functions and activities are exempt from sales and 
use taxes. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(8).) 
3. Sales of tangible personal property to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real property are subject 
to sales and use taxes. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
4. The person who converts personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property since he 
or she is the last person to own it as personal property. (Rule 
R865-19-58S). Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, 802 P. 2d 408 (Utah 1942); Olson Construction 
Company v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 
(Utah 1961); and Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990). 
5. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or repair 
real property. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
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6. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors 
and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final 
consumers, even if the contract is performed for a religious 
institution, charitable organization, or governmental 
instrumentality. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
7. Sales of materials to religious institutions, 
charitable organizations, and governmental instrumentalities 
are exempt only if sold as tangible personal property and the 
direct or indirect selier does not install the material as an 
improvement to realty or use it to repair real property-. (Rule 
R865-19-58S). 
8. The contractor must accrue and report tax on all 
merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing contracts to 
improve or repair real property. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
9. Rule R865-19-58S is the primary rule governing 
the sale of materials and supplies sold to owners, contractors 
and repairmen of real property, and it sets forth the 
requirements for the taxation of the sale or acquisition of 
tangible personal property which is to be used to improve, 
alter or repair real property. That rule provides in relevant 
part: 
A. Sale of tangible personal property 
to real property contractors and 
repairmen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
1. , The person who converts the personal 
property into real property is the 
consumer of the personal property since 
he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
-19-
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2. The contractor or repairman is the 
consumer of tangible personal property 
used to improve, alter or repair real 
property; regardless of the type of 
contract entered into—whether it is a 
lump sum, time and material, or a 
cost-plus contract. 
3. The sale of real property is not 
subject to the tax nor is the labor 
performed on real property. For 
example, the sale of a completed home or 
building is not subject to the tax, but 
sales of materials and supplies to 
contractors and subcontractors are 
taxable transactions as sales to final . 
consumers., This is true whether the 
contract is performed for an individual, 
a religious institution, or a 
governmental instrumentality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or 
charitable institutions and government 
agencies are exempt only if sold as 
tangible personal property and the 
seller does not install the material as 
an improvement to realty or use it to 
repair real property. 
Petitioner has brought Rule R865-19-42S to the 
attention of the Commission, which rule provides: 
A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its 
departments and institutions or to its 
political subdivision such as counties, 
municipalities, school districts, drainage 
districts, irrigation districts, and 
metropolitan water districts are exempt from 
tax if such property [sic] for use in the 
exercise of an essential governmental 
function. If the sale is paid for by a 
warrant drawn upon the state treasurer or the 
official disbursing agent of any political 
subdivision, the sale is considered as being 
made to the state of Utah or its political 
subdivisions and exempt from tax. 
10;" Sales of materials from a vendor to a contractor 
or other person or entity for use in the construction, 
improvement, alteration or repair of real property for a 
governmental entity, religious institution or charitable Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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organization is not exempt from sales and use tax. The 
incidents of the tax have been imposed on the contractor and 
not on the exempt entity. To be exempt, the sale must be from 
the vendor directly to the governmental entity, religious 
institution or charitable organization for the use of, and 
consumption by, the exempt entity. 
11. The fact that the burden of the tax may be passed 
by the contractor on to the exempt entity in the form of higher 
prices and is thus paid indirectly by the exempt entity does 
not result in tax exemption for the transaction. (Rule 
R865-19-58S), Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), and Ford J. 
Twaits Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 
343 (1944), Olsen Construction Company v. State Tax Commission, 
12 U.2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961). 
12. Parties seeking exemptions from the imposition of 
that tax bear the burden of proving that they qualify and are 
legally entitled to the exemption. Parson Asphalt Products v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (1980). 
13. In order for the sale to the exempt entity to be 
exempt from sales and use tax it must be a bona fide sale to 
the exempt entity acting either in the capacity as the final 
consumer of tangible personal property or the entity which 
converts the tangible personal property to real property. The 
sale is such a bona fide sale to an exempt entity only if 
either: 
a. The sale of materials or supplies is to the 
exempt entity and the exempt entity has its own 
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the realty, or 
b. The sale of materials and supplies is to the 
exempt entity, and the exempt entity separately 
hires a contractor to attach the materials and/or 
supplies to the realty on a labor only or install 
only contract, or 
c. The sale of materials and supplies is to an 
exempt entity which acts as the prime contractor 
by converting the tangible personal property to 
real property. 
14. The sale of tangible personal property is not 
exempt from sales and use tax if the exempt entity is simply 
acting as the purchasing agent for the general contractor. It 
is not merely whether the exempt entity engages in the 
mechanics of a purchase, but rather the legal status of the 
exempt entity at the time the purchase is made, i.e., is it 
purchasing the property as the final consumer of the tangible 
personal property. If the exempt entity makes the purchase for 
itself and its own use, consumption, or conversion to real 
property, the purchase is exempt from sales and use tax. On 
the other hand, if the exempt entity makes the purchase for 
another person or entity, or for use, consumption, or 
conversion to real property by another person or entity, the 
purchase is not exempt from sales and use tax because the 
exempt entity has only acted in the capacity of a purchasing 
agent for the final consumer which is the contractor. 
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15. If the exempt entity enters into a furnish and 
install contract with a general or subcontractor which requires 
the general or subcontractor to furnish and install the 
materials and supplies, then the exempt entity is not acting as 
the prime contractor as to the materials and supplies required 
by contract to be provided by the general or subcontractor. 
16. When the general or subcontractor is required by 
contract to provide materials and supplies and install them on 
real property, then the contractor is the consumer of that 
tangible personal property and is liable for the sales and use 
tax, even if an exempt entity goes through the mechanics of a 
purchase by issuing a purchase order and a check for payment. 
The contract is the controlling document, and determines who is 
the final consumer of tangible personal property, and thus the 
contract determines upon which party the incidence of taxation 
falls. Actions taken in noncompliance with the contract may be 
accepted without objection by the contractor and the exempt 
entity, but unless the contract is modified or changed by 
change order to show the consent of the contractor and the 
exempt entity to the modifications, the actions that are not in 
compliance with the contract do not shift or change the 
incidents of taxation. The written terms of the agreement will 
govern the taxability of the transaction and not the actions of 
the parties. This is especially so because written documents 
can be audited by State Tax Commission auditors, but actions, 
based on only after the fact statements, allegations or 
representations are impossible to audit. 
•23-
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17. For the exempt organization to be acting as the 
prime contractor, the exempt organization, by and through its 
own employees or agents must: 
a. Exercise direct supervision over the 
construction project. 
b. Issue purchase orders to the vendors for all 
materials and supplies for which sales tax is not 
paid, 
c. Make direct payment to the vendors for all 
materials and supplies for which sales tax is not 
paid. 
d. Have provisions in any furnish and install 
contracts to permit changes through change orders 
to make that portion of the contract a labor only 
or install only contract, and those contractual 
provisions must be fully implemented and followed 
during the construction process. 
18. For the exempt organizations to act as the prime 
contractor exercising direct supervision over the construction 
project it is not necessary to act as the general contractor 
over the entire project. Instead, the exempt organization must 
exercise sufficient direct supervision over the purchased 
materials that there is a change in the legal status of which 
entity is responsible for those materials. Therefore, the 
exempt organization may be the prime contractor by exercising 
sufficient direct supervision over the purchased materials to 
be the prime contractor for a portion of the total contract. 
-24-
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The prime contractor or direct supervision requirement may 
apply to relationships within the full general contract. 
19. To* be the prime contractor and exercise 
sufficient direct supervision, the exempt organization must 
assume the "burdens of risk" or the "incidents of risk." This 
requires evidence that the exempt organization has done more 
than just act as a "purchasing agent" for the general 
contractor. If a general contractor issues a purchase order on 
forms of the exempt entity and then later issues authorization 
for payment by check to the exempt entity, there has just been 
the creation of a "paper trail" and the direct supervision test 
has not been met. 
20. If the exempt organization and a general 
contractor enter into a furnish and install contract, the 
general contractor is contractually required to provide and 
install those materials. When the contractor provides and 
installs those materials the contractor is the final consumer 
of those materials and is required to pay sales or use tax on 
those materials (Rule R865-19-58S). For the exempt 
organization to purchase those materials and avoid sales or use 
tax, the furnish and install contract must contain a provision 
permitting change orders so the exempt organization may make 
such purchases, and the parties must then actually execute such 
change orders in advance of the purchases. The exempt 
organization, by its own employees or agents, must then issue 
purchase orders and vouchers or checks for payment, and must 
exercise direct supervision over the purchased materials. As 
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evidence regarding whether or not the exempt organization 
exercised direct supervision over the purchased materials, all 
of the relevant factors should be reviewed, including: 
a. Who assumed the burdens or incidents of risk? 
b* Who carried the risk of loss in the event of 
damage or destruction of the materials? 
- c. Who, i f anyone, car r ied and pa id for 
insurance on the materials after delivery 
and prior to installation or attachment to 
the real property? 
d. Who physically inspected and counted the 
materials upon receipt? 
e. If there was a shortage in materials upon 
receipt, who was required to pay for 
additional materials? 
•--•£'•••• If there was an overage in materials upon 
receipt, who retained the surplus materials? 
g. If the materials did not meet specifications 
or quality standards, who had the right and 
authority to reject those materials? 
h. If materials were rejected for failure to 
meet quality standards or specifications, 
and it had resulted in a shutdown of the 
job, who would have been responsible for the 
shutdown expenses? 
i. Who was responsible for enforcing any 
warranties on the materials? 
-26-
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j. To whom did recourse go if the materials 
were faulty or defective? 
k. If materials failed after installation, who 
was responsible for any resulting damages 
including personal injuries? 
1. To whom did the title pass for the purchased 
materials? 
m. Were the bills submitted by the vendor 
directly to the exempt organization? 
n. Did the vendors look only to the exempt 
organization for payment of the bill? 
o. Did the general contractor or the 
subcontractor have to approve the bills 
before they were paid by the exempt 
organization? 
p. To whom were the materials delivered, i.e., 
to the contractor, the exempt organization 
or one of its employees or agents, or 
directly to the job site? 
21. Under a furnish and install contract, the 
contractor is required to furnish the materials and install 
those materials onto real property. Thus, the contractor is 
required to convert that tangible personal property into real 
property and the tax is imposed on that consumption of the 
tangible personal property by the contractor. Therefore, to 
avoid sales and use tax on materials used for a furnish and 
install contract, the contract must be modified through the 
-27-
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execution and implementation of change orders. When those 
change orders have been executed and implemented, the modified 
contract must make it clear that the materials in question have 
been separately purchased and provided by the exempt 
organization and that the contractor's only duty with respect 
to those materials is to provide the labor to install those 
materials. 
22. For the purchases of materials and supplies to be 
exempt from sales and use tax, the exempt entity must make the 
purchase and, title to the purchased items must pass to the 
exempt entity prior to the time it is attached to real 
property. The exempt entity must deal with the purchased items 
as its own property and treat those items the same as it would 
treat items it purchases for its own use and consumption. 
DECISION 
Sales and Use Tax is imposed not only upon the sale of 
tangible personal property, but also upon "tangible personal 
property stored, used or consumed in this state." (U.C.A. 
59-12-103C1]). In the construction business, when a person 
uses lumber, bricks, cement, steel, nails, and other materials 
to construct a building or other improvements to real estate, 
that person has used those materials and has converted the 
materials into real property. That conversion of tangible 
personal property into real property is deemed to be the 
consumption or use of the tangible personal property, which is 
the taxable event. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
sales and use tax is imposed upon the party that converts 
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tangible personal property into real property. Utah Concrete 
Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, supra, Olson 
Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra, and Tummurru 
Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra. The party 
that makes that conversion from tangible personal property to 
real property has used or consumed that property, is the real 
property contractor, and is taxed on that property. If that 
conversion to real property is performed by anyone except an 
exempt entity, the use and consumption of the converted 
materials is subject to sales and use tax. If the conversion 
to real property is performed by an exempt entity acting as the 
real property contractor, the use and consumption of the 
converted materials is not subject to sales and use tax. 
Therefore, the primary issue in this case is to 
determine whether the Petitioner was the real property 
contractor or whether the Utah Transit Authority, Granite 
School District or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints (LDS Church) was the real property contractor. If a 
preponderance of the evidence indicates that Petitioner was the 
party that converted the tangible personal property into real 
property, then Petitioner was the real property contractor and 
is liable for the tax assessed by the Auditing Division. 
However, if a preponderance of the evidence indicates that Utah 
Transit Authority, Granite School District, or the LDS Church, 
or any of them converted the tangible personal property into 
real property then they would be the real property contractor 
and would be exempt from the sales and use tax. 
-29-
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To determine which party was the real property 
contractor, it is necessary to review and analyze the full 
scope of the contract and the legal rights, duties, 
obligations, and relationships of the parties with respect to 
the materials converted into real property. The primary 
evidence available to the Commission to make that determination 
is the contracts and agreements, together with all duly 
executed change orders and other written documents. Oral 
testimony is beneficial in interpreting the documents and 
gaining some insight into the conduct of the parties and, to 
some extent, their understanding of the requirements of the 
contract. However, where any inconsistencies may exist between 
the written contract, including executed change orders, and 
either the conduct or oral testimony of any person, the written 
contract is normally presumed to govern or prevail. 
Utah Transit Authority 
In the portion of this proceeding involving the Utah 
Transit Authority, a preponderance of the evidence shows that 
the legal rights, duties and obligations of Utah Transit 
Authority raised to the level of the real property contractor 
because Utah Transit Authority assumed many of the burdens, 
risks, responsibilities and incidents of ownership of the 
materials being converted to real property. Utah Transit 
Authority hired Jacobsen Construction as the Construction 
Manager of the project, not as the general contractor. The 
contracts with Petitioner, ARCO Electric, and most of the other 
contractors and subcontractors were entered into directly by 
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the Utah Transit Authority. That contract between Petitioner 
and the Utah Transit Authority was for labor only, 
notwithstanding that the contract did contain a provision which 
stated that ARCO was to furnish supplies and materials. 
However, it is clear that there was no money included in the 
contract for materials or supplies. The contract was not a 
furnish and install contract. The original contract was for 
$279,756,00, which was all for labor to install the materials 
supplied by the Utah Transit Authority. Therefore, Utah 
Transit Authority was the prime contractor on the project, and 
Jacobsen Construction was an agent of Utah Transit Authority as 
stated in the contract. Since Utah Transit Authority was the 
prime contractor on the project, they converted the materials 
into real property and the incidents of taxation would be 
imposed on the Utah Transit Authority if it were not an entity 
that is exempt from taxation. 
There are, however, three areas of concern. First, 
the invoices from General Electric were billed to ARCO Electric 
and not to Utah Transit Authority. Second, the contract did 
contain a provision requiring ARCO to provide the materials and 
supplies. Third, many of the purchase orders were not issued 
by Utah Transit Authority until after the materials and 
invoices had already been received. However, while these are 
areas of concern, there are reasonable explanations for each of 
them. The invoices from General Electric appears to be an 
error by General Electric. Invoices for materials from other 
companies were all billed directly to Utah Transit Authority. 
The provision in the contract for ARCO to provide materials and 
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supplies was not followed, and there was no money in the 
contract for materials or supplies and the issuance of 
purchase orders after the receipt of materials and invoices 
appears to be a shortfall caused by trust between the parties, 
and the time pressures of trying to get the job completed as 
rapidly as possible. In addition, because of the steps which 
were taken by Mr. Oswald, the attorney for Utah Transit 
Authority to try to assure compliance with the Tax Commission 
requirements, and the efforts of Utah Transit Authority to try 
to meet those requirements as they understood them, any doubts 
should be resolved in favor of the Utah Transit Authority. 
In viewing the totality of the Utah Transit Authority 
project, Utah Transit Authority was the prime contractor, the 
real property contractor, and the party that converted the 
materials into real property. Utah Transit Authority purchased 
the materials used on that project and assumed most of the 
risks, burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership. 
Those materials were not purchased by Petitioner, and 
Petitioner did not assume the burdens, risks, responsibilities 
and incidents of ownership. Furthermore, the contract was 
really a labor only contract. Therefore, sales and use taxes 
for the Utah Transit Authority project should not be imposed on 
Petitioner. 
In summary, it does appear that Utah Transit Authority 
assumed nearly all of the burdens, risks, responsibilities and 
incidents of ownership of those materials. Thus, a 
preponderance of the evidence indicates that Utah Transit 
Authority converted those materials from tangible personal 
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property into real property. Therefore, Utah Transit Authority 
was the real property contractor for those materials and 
pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was exempt from the use tax on 
those materials. 
Granite School District / 
In the portion of this proceeding involving Granite 
School District, a preponderance of the evidence shows that the 
legal rights, duties and obligations of the school district did 
not rise to the level of the real property contractor because 
the school district did not assume the burdens, risks, 
responsibilities and incidents of ownership of the materials 
being converted to real property. Except for the paper work 
involved in the purchase order and the check for payment, the 
school district had only minimal involvement in the project, 
including the materials, during the construction process. The 
general contractor and the subcontractors had nearly total 
control of and responsibility for the materials during the 
construction process. 
There are numerous factors which show that Granite 
School District did not assume the burdens, risks, 
responsibilities and incidents of ownership. The price bid by 
Petitioner included all materials. The Petitioner negotiated 
and administered the direct purchases by the owner and 
furnished to the owner the source of supply and other 
information to enable the School District to purchase the 
materials. The risk of loss from damage, theft, vandalism or 
destruction of the materials was on the Petitioner after 
delivery of the materials. Storage of the materials was the 
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responsibility of Petitioner. The Petitioner was required to 
hold the owner harmless from any failure of the materials. The 
Petitioner was required to receive, inspect and sign for the 
materials upon delivery. The Petitioner could be held 
responsible for the loss of any prompt payment discounts or 
trade discounts, even though the School District was the party 
supposedly responsible for the payment. The construction bonds 
and insurance required from the Petitioner were not reduced to 
take away the responsibility for the materials purchased by the 
School District. The provisions for direct purchase by the 
School District did not relieve the Petitioner of any duties or 
obligations with respect to those materials. The invoices and 
requests for payment were made out in the name of the School 
District but were sent to the General Contractor for approval 
before the School District would make payment. The School 
District did not directly enter into the contract with 
Petitioner. Instead, Petitioner entered into its contract with 
the General Contractor. 
All of the above factors show that the risks of 
ownership were never assumed by the School District, and those 
risks continued to be assumed by Petitioner. The primary 
involvement of the School District was in the paper work, or 
the creation of a paper trail. Except for the creation of that 
paper trail, the School District had only minimal physical 
contacts with the materials. 
The school district did carry insurance on those 
materials, but the contractor was also required to carry 
insurance on those materials. The contractor and 
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subcontractors (including Petitioner) had all other burdens, 
risks, responsibilities and incidents of ownership on those 
materials. The Petitioner was contractually required to 
provide the materials for its portion of the project. 
Petitioner installed those materials onto the project, and 
acted as the owner of those materials by assuming the risks, 
burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership during the 
construction process. A preponderance of the evidence 
indicates ' that Petitioner converted those materials from 
tangible personal property into real property. Therefore, 
Petitioner was the real property contractor for those materials 
and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on 
those materials. 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
Print Center 
In the portion of this proceeding involving the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Print Center, a 
preponderance of the evidence show that the legal rights, 
duties and obligations of the LDS Church did not rise to the 
level of the real property contractor because the LDS Church 
did not assume the burdens, risks, responsibilities and 
incidents of ownership of the materials being converted to real 
property. Except for the paper work involved in the purchase 
order and the check for payment, the LDS Church did not have 
substantial involvement in the project, or with the materials, 
during the construction process. The general contractor and 
the subcontractors had nearly total control of and 
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responsibility for the materials during the construction 
process-
There are also numerous factors which show the LDS 
Church did not assume the burdens, risks, responsibilities and 
incidents of ownership. The Church did not directly enter into 
the contract with Petitioner. Instead, Petitioner entered into 
its contract with the General Contractor. The price bid by 
Petitioner included all materials. The Petitioner was required 
to provide to the Church all of the necessary information, 
including the vendor and pricing, of where to purchase the 
materials. The risk of loss was on the Petitioner, and 
Petitioner was required to hold the Church harmless for the 
supplies or materials and from any loss, claim, defect, 
discrepancy, delay in delivery, or any other problem related to 
the supplies or materials. The Petitioner was responsible for 
the receipt, inspection, approval, storage and safe keeping of 
the materials. The construction bonds and insurance required 
from the Petitioner were not reduced to take away the 
responsibility for the materials purchased by the Church. The 
provisions for direct purchase by the Church did not relieve 
the Petitioner from the responsibility to fully comply with the 
contract, including providing the materials. The original 
purchase orders were prepared by the Petitioner. The Church 
would not pay for the materials until the Petitioner had 
approved the invoices for payment. 
All of these factors show that the risks of ownership 
were never assumed by the Church, and those risks continued to 
be assumed by Petitioner. The primary involvement of the 
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Church was in the paper work, or the creation of a paper 
trail. Except for the creation of that paper trail, the Church 
had only minimal physical contacts with the materials. 
The Church did employ a full time project 
representative who was on the project site on a full time 
basis, and part of his duties related to the materials 
purchased by the Church. The purchase orders and checks for 
payment were issued by the Church, and the furnish and install 
contract did contain provisions for change orders and change 
orders were executed. 
However, the Commission must determine the case based 
upon a preponderance of the evidence. The Petitioner was 
contractually required to provide the materials for its portion 
of the project. Petitioner installed those materials onto the 
project, and acted as the owner of those materials by assuming 
the risks, burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership 
during the construction process. Therefore, a preponderance of 
the evidence indicates that Petitioner converted those 
materials from tangible personal property into real property. 
Therefore, Petitioner was the real property contractor for 
those materials and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for 
the use tax on those materials. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the order of the Utah 
State Tax Commission that the Petition for Redetermination for 
the Utah Transit Authority project is hereby granted, and the 
audit assessment made by the Auditing Division for that project 
is reversed and set aside. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
npptzaj. «u . o / —i^/w 
The P e t i t i o n for Redetermination for the Granite 
School D i s t r i c t project and the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints Print Center project i s hereby denied, and 
the audit assessment made by the Auditing Divis ion on those two 
projects i s affirmed. I t i s so ordered. 
DATED t h i s //f1 day of ^T^^JCX^ , 1992. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
'JoG B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
thUu^i^^ 
S. Blaine Wil les 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of^jthe f inal 
order to f i l e a request for reconsideration or thi££fc?j|B3Kdays 
after the date of f ina l order to f i l e in Sy/p£$fc^J&fac^. a 
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